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PROBLEMATIC LEGAL PLURALISM: CAUSES AND SOME 





The tools of analytical positivism and economic analysis are applied to the phenomenon of legal pluralism.  An 
analytical framework is developed to ascertain when legal pluralism is problematic in the control of 
wrongdoing.  It is demonstrated that there are three specific cases; rivalrous compliance, sanctions for wrong 
behaviour that are deemed to be wrongs themselves and the uncoordinated sanctioning of common wrongs.  
Then there is a discussion of the consequences and some approaches that can be used to ameliorate each case 
that has been identified.  It is hoped that this framework will be used to guide future practical and theoretical 
discussions on legal pluralism and its potential problems.             
 Keywords: legal pluralism, law and economics, legal dissonance, norms, criminal law, religious law 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This article provides a framework for organising and guiding theoretical and practical 
discussion that relates to the phenomenon of legal pluralism. It is suggested that legal 
pluralism can only become a truly useful concept for those concerned with institutional 
design if there is greater analytical clarity and a more systematic analysis of its problematic 
manifestations.   It is hoped that this article provides some much needed progress in these 
areas, something that seems all the more important given that the term is growing both in 
recognition and use, especially by policy makers and development practitioners.
2
       
We know that non-state groupings can greatly enhance the quality and meaning of people’s 
lives.  These groupings, often with their own rules of conduct, can also order social relations 
and provide an important role in regulating harmful and anti-social behaviour.  They include 
various religious organisations, indigenous customary tribes and clans, sporting clubs, 
companies, organised crime networks and various professional and trade organisations.  
While the state usually asserts supremacy over all the rules these groups produce, nonetheless 
these groups may claim their authority from other sources that are completely separate from 
the state.  As such, they may aim to continue to enforce their rules, regardless of the state’s 
stance toward them – whether it be supportive or hostile. 
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The phenomenon of co-existing rule generating groupings in the same society can be referred 
to as legal pluralism, and this term, or more correctly concept, needs some explanation.
3
  The 
most important assumption embedded within the legal pluralism literature provides the 
conceptual foundation for this paper. This assumption is simple but it has significant 
analytical consequences.  This assumption (or claim) is that there is no single validating 
source of law or laws in a society.
4
  This implies that there can be other sources of law 
completely separate from the state.   Both Griffiths (1986) and Woodman (1999) stress that 
non-state groupings can maintain their own distinct sources of legitimacy and authority 
separately from the state.
5
  While state activity can affect the workings of non-state groupings 
(and vice versa), this assumption implies that these interactions are to be considered in terms 
of a horizontal rather than a vertical relationship.   
While one can acknowledge that multiple legal orders with their own sources of authority 
may exist within a given society, it is a separate issue whether legal pluralism has positive or 
negative effects– the topic this article investigates. On the is rather than the ought, it is 
noteworthy that there is a body of literature that stresses that co-existing ‘legal orders’, with 
very different sources of legitimacy, is the norm rather than the exception, both across place 
and time in human society. Indeed Benton (2012), Glenn (2010), and Twining (2009) all 
highlight the fact that in Europe the state’s claim to a monopoly of law has been asserted for 
no more than two centuries.
6
 
In the interest of analytical precision, while acknowledging the longstanding debate over 
what is ‘law’, the following definitions are used: legal pluralism refers to a situation where at 
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 This explanation is necessary as it remains, at least to some extent, a contested term and concept.  This is 
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least two legal orders assert jurisdiction over the same geographical space and persons within 
that space; and a legal order is defined as a set of rules and practices that are oriented towards 
ordering relations between persons with its own source of authority.
7
  It is also suggested that 
each legal order has its own production function that converts various inputs into the 
provision and enforcement of law.
8
  These definitions are adopted primarily for practical 
reasons.  They are broad enough to capture interactions between state law and religious law, 
indigenous customary law, and the ‘law’ of various other non-state legal orders.9  However, 
they are also narrow enough to exclude some phenomena traditionally bundled under the 
heading of ‘norms’ in the law and economics literature, including internalised morals and 
individual social conventions.
10
       
The study of the phenomenon of legal pluralism as defined above is non-trivial for two 
reasons.
11
  First, many developing nations were subject to a colonial legal transplant, which 
effectively saw a new legal order being overlaid on a pre-existing one, and both often 
continue to enforce their rules to the present day.  The recent empirical work of 
Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013) and others highlights the enduring importance of 
pre-colonial institutions today in many developing countries.
12
  In terms of problematic 
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interactions Rautenbach and Jacques (2010) have highlighted a range of injustices faced by 
people living under indigenous custom in South Africa who find themselves in a state court 
with differing conceptions of what is wrong; Bierschenk (2008) has highlighted the fact that 
non-state obligations can lead public servants to engage in activities considered criminal by 
the state in Benin; Forsyth (2009) has identified wrongdoers being excessively punished by 
multiple punishments from multiple sources in Vanuatu; while Larcom and Swanson (2013) 
highlight the practice of (extrajudicial) payback killings in Papua New Guinea, that are 
deemed to be a legitimate sanction under traditional customary law. 
The second reason for better understanding legal pluralism mainly primarily concerns a 
number of Western states that are experiencing the phenomenon brought about by large 
migrations from east to west and south to north.  Just as European settlers brought their laws 
(including their non-state religious law) and norms with them to new lands, it is equally 
reasonable to expect migrants from other parts of the world should also aim to bring theirs 
too, and indeed many do.  In this regard, it is noteworthy that the Muslim population makes 
up a sizable minority in the United States and Western Europe which is projected to grow 
both in proportional and absolute terms over the coming decades.
13
  It is also noteworthy that 
there has been a wave of recent legislative activity aimed at ‘banning foreign laws’ in the 
United States.  Since 2010 seven states have enacted legislation and another 25 have 
introduced similar bills into their legislatures.
14
  But those Muslim Americans who may wish 
to abide by Islamic law are one of many groups of persons who aim to abide by their own 
rules.  In the United States, in addition to over one hundred Native American groups who 
claim their own law, so do other religious faiths, with Canon Law and Halakha, being two 
other prominent examples. 
Religious observances can place an individual in direct conflict with the criminal law of the 
state.  For instance, since the Protestant reformation, Roman Catholic priests in England have 
no explicit penitent-priest privilege in relation to Confession and may find themselves in 
Contempt of Court if they fail to divulge the contents of such a conversation under oath ..
15
  
However, under the Code of Canon Law (Canon 983) which also applies to Catholic priests 
in England it is ‘a crime’ for a priest to break the seal of confession ‘for any reason’.  In 
relation to Sikhs, under their Five Articles of Faith, those initiated (Amritdhari) are required 
to wear kirpan (a dagger) and there have been number of instances in the United States and 
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Canada where Sikhs have faced criminal charges for wearing a kirpan and some children 
have been barred from school for wearing them (Juss 2012).  In relation to Shari’a law while 
most hudad crimes, are also crimes or civil wrongs in the United States (e.g. theft, highway 
robbery, rebellion, and slander) some are not, most notably, apostasy and the drinking of 
alcohol. In addition, many of the specified sanctions, if taken literally, would be considered 
grave crimes themselves (e.g. flogging for slander; amputation for theft and highway robbery; 
and death for apostasy).
16
  However, the potential for problematic interactions between 
different rule generating bodies is not only an issue in relation to religion.  For instance, 
certain by-laws of country clubs governing the admittance of members can run counter to 
Constitutional rights and privileges and anti-discrimination laws (Charpentier 2004); there 
can be conflicting rules between different financial market regulators (Lenglet 2011); while 
some cults and gangs are known to sometimes deliberately create and enforce rules that are in 
direct opposition to the state or (broader society) in an effort to force a decision to stay or 
leave (Iannaccone 1992). 
From actual observation we know that the state can take many different stances to non-state 
legal orders.  Sometimes, it explicitly condemns them and attempts to eradicate them (e.g. the 
Mafia); other times it incorporates parts of their rules into its own law (e.g. the Uniform 
Commercial Code); other times it makes concessions (e.g. Canon Law and priestly privilege 
in the United States) and most often it simply ignores them.
17
  We can also expect non-state 
legal orders to react to the state’s negative stance in various ways; for instance by reducing 
enforcement (customary sanctions in many developing societies), reforming their substantive 
rules to make them more consistent with the state (e.g. the Church of Latter-day Saints and 
polygamy) or defying the state (either openly or with secrecy as is the case with many 
criminal gangs) and engaging in a battle for institutional survival.  Both law and norms 
change over time, with a vast literature on how and why this can occur, however this analysis 
is focused on the comparative statics of legal pluralism – the time period (which may last 
centuries) when different rule generating bodies, with their own different sets of rules, co-
exist in the same society.
 18
 
The study of legal pluralism in this context raises one of the most fundamental questions that 
any legislator, or state authority, must consider: what harms or injuries can occur 
systematically if one community within a larger community adopts its own governing rules?  
This article aims provide an answer to this question.  Specifically, it aims to identify when 
legal pluralism is problematic in relation to wrongdoing and provide some guidance on how 
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such circumstances can be ameliorated.  It hoped that this analysis can be applied to the 
interactions between the law of the state and any subgroup in society who aims to enforce its 
own set of rules.   However, it should be noted from the outset that it is acknowledged that 
greater analytical precision comes at a cost; especially in terms of recognising the complexity 
of legal pluralism, the interactions between legal orders, and the legal orders themselves.  All 
the same, this article aims to provide some clarity in the current haze of the literature. 
The outline of this paper going forward is as follows: first there is brief a review of the 
literature that relates to legal pluralism and its potential problems, with a specific focus on the 
law and economics literature has to offer this topic; this is followed by the development of an 
analytical framework that enables legal pluralism to be conceptualised for any society, 
including the identification of idiosyncratic and common wrongs and sanctions; this 
framework is then used to identify the three specific cases of problematic legal pluralism; 
then there is a discussion on how each specific form of problematic pluralism can be 
ameliorated; and finally, there are some concluding comments.         
 2.  REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Both the legal pluralism literature and the law and economics literature that relates to the 
phenomenon of legal pluralism are extensive, however, do date, there has been no 
comprehensive analytical framework developed for considering it in a systematic fashion or 
the application of  economic analysis to the phenomenon.  In this sense, and as mentioned 
earlier, it is hoped that this paper not only extends the literature but also provides a 
framework for judging the current arguments in the literature that lack formality or are 
formalised badly. 
As a general comment, while the legal pluralism literature is rich in descriptive case studies, 
it is poor in analytical clarity and normative analysis; and as such is not particularly helpful 
for those concerned with institutional design.  Conversely, the economic literature has a 
normative focus, but varies considerably in terms of formalisation and the phenomena that 
seeks to analyse and as such is highly disjointed, and to some extent confused.  Therefore, the 
purpose of this brief review is to draw-out what is already known concerning legal pluralism 
and its problems (primarily) from the economics literature to provide a systematic analysis to 
the phenomenon of legal pluralism.   
Since Ellickson’s (1992) seminal book, the literature on the interaction of law and norms has 
grown considerably, and much of this is directly relevant to the study of legal pluralism.  A 
considerable literature has developed analysing whether different ‘norms’ are complements 
or substitutes to the ‘law’.19 In terms of substitutes, the most obvious economic application is 
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to model an oligopolistic market for legal services.
20
  Indeed some authors have used Cournot 
and Stackelberg models, most notably Ben-Shahar and Harel (1995) and Silva and Caplan 
(1997).21  Benabou and Tirole (2011) and Zasu (2007) have combined key elements of the 
literature to show how norms can act as both complements and substitutes to state law.
22
   
Some have also concentrated on the efficiencies associated with sanctions and enforcement 
efforts from multiple sources, such as Landes and Posner (1975) and Kaplow and Shavell 
(2007).  Critically, however, there is a general presumption that the multiple sources of rules 
(or law) deem the same behaviour as wrong.
23
  When analysts do acknowledge that norms 
can differ from the state law, the omnipotence of the state is often assumed. For instance 
Cooter (1998), Dharmapala and McAdams (2003), Geisinger (2002), and Funk (2005) all 
emphasise the social engineering capacity of the state (often termed as the expressive or 
communicative function of law).  It is often assumed that the state is able to create and 
perpetuate norms through the communicative role of the law in changing internalised beliefs 
within society. Others, such as Posner (1996a, 1996b) and Posner and Rasmusen (1999:382), 
emphasise the coercive power of state, suggesting the state can eliminate ‘inefficient’ or ‘bad 
norms’ through criminal sanctions.24 More recently, Aldashev et al (2012), applying a 
bargaining in the shadow of the law model, suggest greater access to state law courts will 
lead to convergence between non-state rules where they differ. 
 
However, we know that sometimes non-state groupings doggedly resist the state, raising the 
potential for long lasting (or even persistent) problematic legal pluralism.
25
  Here the club 
literature pioneered by Buchanan (1965) and the economics of religion is of particular 
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overlapping jurisdictions, and the negative interaction effects (see Hutchinson and Kennedy 2008, Langpap and 
Shimshack 2010), or, Kovacic 2001 in the context of antitrust enforcement externalities.         
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 See Cooter (1997a; 1997b; 1998; 2000) who argues that law often evolves out of social norms leading to 
efficiency gains. Also see Segal and Whinston (2006), Garoupa (1997, 2003) and Polinsky (1980). 
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 Knight (1992) suggests that for a new state law to displace conflicting norms, expectations among the 
population must change through expressive information and the use of state sanctions.  He suggests that without 
a proper enforcement mechanism there is unlikely to be a move from the old equilibrium to a new state based 
equilibrium.  Kahan (2000: 607) who provides a basic model to analyse state efforts to change what he calls 
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25
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also been highlighted by Bicchieri (2006), Greif (2006), Aoki (2001), and Basu (2000). 
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relevance.  Iannaccone (1992) suggests certain groups may maintain rules that are in direct 
opposition to the state in an effort to encourage commitment and reduce defection. If 
members have broken state laws, defection is less likely as they will likely face punishment 
by the state coupled with a loss of protection from the sect.  Therefore, resisting convergence 
makes participation in state related activities more costly, and can lead to a ‘corner solution’ 
between the members of the sub-group and the larger society.
26
       
 
While there are many insights from the law and norms literature of direct relevance, 
especially modelling providers of law in an oligopolistic market, the economic literature has 
not yet fully grasped the concept  legal pluralism.  Specifically there has been a failure to 
recognise that non-state legal orders can be complex systems and that they often aim to 
regulate a broad scope of behaviours; which means they have the potential to simultaneously 
support, undermine and be inconsequential to the state.  It will be shown below that a more 
systematic approach allows for some analytical insights to be gained.  For instance, 
somewhat paradoxically, problematic legal pluralism can arise when the legal orders have the 
same conceptions of wrongdoing and may not arise when they have completely different (but 
not opposite) conceptions of wrongdoing.  A key insight gained from the analysis below is 
the distinction between legally wrong behaviour and the sanctions that are attached to such 
behaviour.           
 
3. ANALYSING LEGALLY WRONG, NEUTRAL AND GOOD BEHAVIOUR IN 
A LEGALLY PLURALISTIC SOCIETY 
This section applies analytical positivism to conceptualise legal pluralism at a high degree of 
precision.  For the moment, consider a homogenous society where only one legal order 
operates, and therefore by definition, legal pluralism is not present.  To begin the analysis, 
and building on the work of Ellickson (1992), the universe of behaviours, A, which includes 
both acts and omissions, is divided into legally wrong, W, legally neutral, N, and legally 
good, G, behaviour.  That is: 
  {                      } 
  {                         } 
  {                      } 
This analysis is represented in Figure 1 below, where the box represents all possible 
behaviours in this society.  In a society with only one legal order all possible behaviours, A, 
are contained in either the sets G, N, and W.  Furthermore, we assume that the legal order 
does not contradict itself, and therefore the three sets are complements to one another.  That 
is, a certain behaviour cannot be an element of more than one set.27 
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  {    |            }  
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Figure 1: Universe of Behaviours in a Homogenous Society with One Legal Order 
 
We can expect that these behaviours will have legal consequences: legally wrong behaviour 
is punishable, legally neutral behaviours have no legal consequences while legally good 
behaviour is to be rewarded.
28
    While Ellickson’s (1992) typology is a useful starting point, 
it is augmented to gain greater insight into the legal pluralism and its consequences. 
In deeming behaviour to be of a certain type the legal order observes both the acts and 
omissions of those individuals it asserts jurisdiction over.  That is, whether or not certain 
behaviours are deemed to be legally wrong, legally neutral, or legally good will depend on 
commission and omission of certain acts and each legal order’s concept of prohibited, 
imperative, and good actions.  This distinction is necessary to develop the concept of 
rivalrous compliance, a concept new to the literature. 
Prohibitions, P, are as those actions that the legal order deems shall not be done.  Imperatives, 
I, are those actions that the legal order deems shall be done.  While good actions, GA, are 
those that the legal order deems to exceed imperative actions in terms of their merit.
29
   As 
before, we assume that the legal order does not contradict itself, in terms of actions so the 
three sets P, I and GA are complements to one another and therefore these actions,   , cannot 
be an element of more than one set.30  That is: 
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 Legally wrong behaviour is ‘punishable’ in the sense that the wrongdoer is subject to legal punishment; 
however the actual punishment may not be enforced: due to insufficient capacity of the legal order (e.g. the 
wrongdoer may be unidentified or out of reach of the legal order’s agents); or due to a lack of will to punish the 
wrongdoer (e.g. due to clemency, mercy or amnesty provisions that are found in almost all legal orders).  
Similarly, a reward good behaviour may not be awarded.  
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 Such behaviour is referred to supererogation in moral philosophy.   
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 More formally this can be written as:  {    |             };   {    |             }; and 
   {     |            }  For this assumption to hold, a degree of specificity is required by the legal 
order in defining  ,   and   ; in terms of the physical act itself and the circumstances that surround it (e.g. 




  {                                                    } 
  {                                                }  
   {                                                                        } 
Having defined prohibitions, imperatives, and good actions and allowing for behaviour to 
consist of both the commission and omission of acts we can define legal classifications as: 
  {                                } 
  {                                                 } 
  {                } 
The different types of legal behaviours in terms of prohibitions, imperatives, and goods and 
actions and omissions are also summarised in Table 1 below.     
Table 1: Legal Behaviours in Terms of Commissions and Omissions. 
 Commission Omission 
Prohibition Wrong Neutral 
Imperative Neutral Wrong 
Good Good Neutral 
 
3.1 A legal Positivist Framework 
In distinguishing between legally wrong, neutral, and good behaviour a legal positivist 
approach is used.  That is, it is assumed that there is no necessary connection between the law 
and morality (internalised values).31 In a legally pluralistic society, a legal positivist approach 
is essential, unless both legal orders have the same conceptions of what is legally wrong, 
neutral, and good, and that this accords with the morality of the entire population.32 In any 
case, the potential for a divergence between law and morality arises for two obvious reasons 
in any society, whether it is legally pluralistic or not.   
This divergence can occur if the morals or objective functions of those who make the laws 
differ from that of society.  The most obvious example is a dictator who uses law primarily as 
an instrument for wealth maximisation, repression, or social control.  Alternatively, in a 
representative democracy if law is made by social reformers (conservatives) for the purpose 
of changing (maintaining) morality we can also expect a divergence.  More generally, we 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
consequences, intention and defences).  In reality this is difficult, and despite tonnes of ink in some cases, most 
legal orders have some degree of ambiguity concerning the legal consequences of certain acts and omissions.                              
31
 See the seminal works of Bentham (1843), Austin (1879), and Hart (1961). 
32
 Indeed, even if there was the same number of moral frameworks as legal orders in a society which could 
allow for each legal order to mirror each moral framework however, there would still be a disconnection 
between different legal orders and different moral frameworks.   
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should expect a divergence between law and morality if law or morality changes over time 
and there is some inertia. 
Assuming that law and morality do converge over time, we can also expect a divergence 
between law and morality due to differences in the scope of behaviour that a legal order seeks 
to regulate compared to the domain of morality.  Even in a homogenous society where the 
legal order mirrors morality not all legally wrong behaviour may be considered immoral, nor 
will all immoral behaviour necessarily be considered legally wrong.  This reality is 
highlighted by the well known concepts of mala in se and mala prohibita.  While some 
legally wrong behaviour may not be considered immoral, it is equally true that some 
behaviour that may be considered morally wrong may not be legally wrong.
33
   
3.2 Distinguishing between Wrongs, Harms, and Sanctions 
In order to manage the analytical complexity, and with little loss of explanatory power, the 
analysis going forward will concentrate on wrong behaviour, its punishment, and the 
consequent effect of legal pluralism on the deterrence of legal wrongs.  Casual observation 
suggests that legal orders, state or non-state, devote most of their effort to defining and 
punishing wrong behaviour rather than rewarding good behaviour.34 
To adequately consider legally wrong behaviour and its punishment, it is necessary to make a 
distinction between wrongs (i.e. legal wrongs) and harms.  Harms, H, are defined as 
behaviours, either by act or omission, which cause physical or mental pain to an individual.  
That is: 
  {                                              } 
Harmful behaviour occurs regardless of intention or circumstances, it is merely behaviour 
that causes pain.  Evidently, not all harmful behaviour is legally wrong.  This may be because 
the legal order explicitly takes into account the circumstances surrounding the harmful 
behaviour or that the behaviour is outside the scope of regulation.  For instance, in relation to 
circumstance, harmful behaviour may not be legally wrong if there was no intention to cause 
harm, while in relation to scope, the betrayal of a friend may not be legally wrong per se.  In 
both cases, despite the potential to cause great pain such behaviours may not be legally 
wrong.  The fact that not all harmful behaviours are legal wrongs was highlighted by 
Bentham (2011:182)
 35
 who spoke of ‘the multitude of crying injuries which are left without 
redress’.  The key point to be made is that not all harmful behaviours are legally wrong due to 
the circumstances and a reluctance, or inability, of most legal orders to intervene in every 
                                                          
33
 The most obvious example is lying.  While lying may be considered morally wrong it is unlikely to be legally 
wrong per se.  Similarly, some morally good behaviours are unlikely to be legally good behaviours. 
34
 Indeed traditional definitions of law relate to the ability to inflict suffering on wrongdoers (see Bentham 1843 
and Austin 1879). In the process of punishing wrong behaviour, legal orders may offer rewards to secure the 
punishment of a wrongdoer.  As noted by Hart (1961) legal orders can also confer power on individuals to make 
binding agreements (e.g. marriages and contracts) however, even the violation of these agreements can be seen 
as a wrong.     
35
 Note that the first complete version of Bentham’s Place and Time was first published in 2011.  
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aspect of human life.  The set of behaviours contained in the set of legal wrongs, W, is not 
necessarily the same as those contained in the set of harms, H.  However, it is reasonable to 
expect a significant degree of overlap between legally wrong behaviour and harmful 
behaviour in a homogenous society.  That is, in terms of behaviours (the commission and 
omission of acts) we can expect the intersection of each of the sets, W, and H (     to be 
non-empty.  This means that we can expect some behaviour to be both wrong and harmful.  
However, we can also expect some behaviour to be harmful but not wrong and for some 
behaviour to be wrong but not harmful. 
We can also expect a legal order to punish wrong behaviour.  Specifically, some harms 
regardless if they are wrong, are sanctioned by the legal order as a legitimate punishment for 
legally wrong behaviour,      .  This subset of harms is labelled as sanctions, S, and are 
defined as:   
  {                                                           } 
In terms of behaviours we can expect that the intersection of the sets W and S (     to be 
non-empty.  That is, some harms used as punishment for wrong behaviour would themselves 
be wrongs if they were not sanctioned.
 36
  For instance, a legal order may sanction various 
harms as punishment for wrongdoing; including homicide (capital punishment), deprivation 
of liberty (imprisonment), and the seizure of assets (fines or compensation payments).  
Finally, we can also expect that not all sanctions would be wrongs, for instance the 
withdrawal of certain privileges or permissions or simply shunning someone.  The 
intersection of harms, wrongs and sanctions (a subset of harms) is represented in Figure 2 
below. 
Figure 2: Overlap of Wrongs, Harms and Sanctions 
                                                          
36
 That is, the behaviour (act or omission) would satisfy the specific requirements deeming it to be a prohibition 
or imperative (making it a wrong) other than the fact that it is deemed to be a legitimate legal sanction by the 
legal order for wrong behaviour.  The process of converting an otherwise wrong behaviour into a legitimate 
punishment will vary between legal orders; however a warrant serves this purpose in a number of formal legal 




A summary of the key analytical insights to date is contained in Table 2 below and explained 
as follows.  Wrongs are the commission of Prohibited Acts or the omission of Imperative 
Acts.  Behaviour deemed to be wrong is punishable.  A distinction was made between Wrong 
behaviour and Harmful behaviour.  Harms cause physical or mental pain, either by act or 
omission regardless of their circumstance.  Importantly, based on due process, some Harms 
are Sanctioned by the legal order as a punishment for Wrong behaviour.  By definition, the 
set of behaviours that are Sanctions for Wrongs are a subset of harms      .  Furthermore, 
the intersection of the sets of behaviours W and S (         is assumed to be non-empty 
in the sense that some, perhaps most, behaviours that are sanctions would be Wrongs if they 
were not Sanctioned as punishment for Wrong behaviour.      
Table 2: Wrong Behaviour and its Consequences under Legal Monism 
Legally Wrong Behaviour  Legal Consequences 
1. Wrong (W) behaviour consists of: 
2. The commission of a Prohibition Act 
(     , or 
3. The omission of an Imperative Act 
(     .   
1. A Wrongdoer is Sanctioned (   
2. Sanctions are behaviours that are a 
subset of harms (H) that are permitted 
by a legal order as punishment for 
wrongdoing      . 
3. Some Sanctions are Wrongs (   
   or (     , so that        
 
3.3 Multiple Wrongs and Sanctions 
To date, the analytical effort has been devoted to considering the nature of wrongs and 
sanctions in terms of acts and omissions in a legally monistic society.  Now it will be 





assumed there are two legal orders that assert their jurisdiction in a given society, the non-
state legal order (subscript c) and the state legal order (subscript s).   
Within this society, some behaviours are deemed to be wrong under the non-state law, Wc, 
and some harms are sanctioned under the non-state legal order, Sc, as punishment for wrongs.  
For grave wrongs the sanctions, Sc, may be severe.  Therefore, if an individual behaves in a 
way that is an element of the set Wc he or she faces a sanction that is an element of the set Sc 
under the non-state law.  In addition to the non-state law, the state legal order also claims 
jurisdiction over the same geographic space and persons within it.  It also deems certain 
actions as wrong and sanctions them.  The behaviours the state legal order deems wrong are 
contained in the set labelled Ws and its sanctions are contained in the set Ss.  The overlay of 
the state legal order on the customary legal order is represented diagrammatically below. 
Figure 3: Space of Wrongs and Sanctions under legal pluralism  
 
 
Within the set, Wc, - non-state wrongs - are all the behaviours that are wrong under the non-
state legal order, and within the set, Ws - state wrongs - are all behaviours that are wrong 
under the state legal order.  Within the set, Sc, - non-state sanctions - are all sanctions under 
the non-state legal order, and within the set, Ss, - state sanctions - are all sanctions under the 
state legal order. 
As can be seen, each of the sets intersect.  This represents some overlap between the two 
legal order’s conception of wrong and sanctions.  However, it also suggests that some state 
sanctions are non-state wrongs, and most importantly for this analysis, that some non-state 
sanctions are state wrongs. 
        Wc 
Ws 
Sc 
      Ss 
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Both legal orders sanction wrongs, however, only those that it deems wrong.  In this legally 
pluralistic society the total set of wrongs is represented by the union of the sets Wc and Ws.  It 
contains the behaviours considered wrong by either legal order.  The set of total wrongs is 
represented by:  
   {           }        . 
Both legal orders may deem the same behaviours as wrong.  The set of wrongs common to 
both legal orders, common wrongs, is represented by the intersection of the two sets Wc and 
Ws: 
   {            }          . 
One legal order may deem certain behaviours as wrong, while the other does not.  The set of 
these actions, idiosyncratic wrongs, can be represented by subtracting those behaviours 
considered wrong by one legal order with those considered wrong by the other.  The set of 
idiosyncratic non-state wrongs is represented by: 
    {                            }       ; and 
the set of idiosyncratic state wrongs is represented by: 
    {                         }        . 
The size of each of these derived sets will depend on the degree of difference between the 
two legal orders.  If the set of wrongs of the two legal orders were identical, that is Wc = Ws, 
the sets TW and CW would also be identical.  In such a case the sets IWc and IWs would be 
empty:         and        .  However, if the sets Wc and Ws are not identical, then the 
sets TW and CW will not be equivalent and the sets IWc and IWs may not be empty.  There are 
various possibilities when the sets Wc and Ws are not identical. 
Perhaps the most plausible scenario is that each legal order deems some behaviours as wrong, 
but also deem some others as idiosyncratically wrong.  In this case, the set of common 
wrongs will be non-empty:          , as will be the two sets containing idiosyncratic 
wrongs,          and        .  This scenario is represented in Figure 2 above, where the 
sets Wc and Ws intersect but not completely.  Interestingly, most of the economic analysis to 
legal pluralism implicitly assumes that the behaviours considered wrong are shared by both 
legal orders, whereas it is shown here that there are three possibilities with two legal orders. 
While sanctions can be categorised in terms of total, common, and idiosyncratic, it is more 
useful to analyse them in terms of whether they are considered wrongs by the other legal 
order.  Two sets represent the intersection of one legal order’s set of sanctions with the 
other’s set of wrongs: represented by: 
     {                                        }         ; and 
     {                                       }          . 
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Two other sets represent those sanctions that do not intersect with the other legal order’s set 
of wrongs. They are: 
      {                                             }      –  ; and 
      {                                           }      –  . 
The possibility of an intersection of one legal order’s set of sanctions with the other legal 
order’s set of wrongs is represented in the figure above.  The reason for this intersection will 
depend on the type of sanction and whether the legitimacy of the legal order is recognised by 
the other.  When one legal order’s sanction is a wrong under the other, it has the potential to 
bring the two legal orders into conflict both in the sanctioning of idiosyncratic or common 
wrongs. 
4. CAUSES OF PROBLEMATIC LEGAL PLURALISM 
From the preceding analysis, problematic legal pluralism (or legal dissonance) can now be 
identified with precision, something that has not been done before.  It is claimed that there are 
three potential causes of problematic legal pluralism in the control of wrongs.  The first 
concerns situations where wrong behaviour, under one or the other legal order, is inevitable - 
labelled rivalrous compliance.  The second potential cause is when one legal order’s sanction 
for wrong behaviour is deemed to be a wrong by the other.  The third is the uncoordinated 
sanctioning of common wrongs.    
The first two types, rivalrous compliance and sanctions that are wrongs, are deemed 
problematic because they necessarily lead to increased enforcement costs and/or lower 
productivity levels for the legal orders involved.  Specifically, these two types can lead to one 
or both legal orders imposing negative externalities on the other.  The third type, 
uncoordinated sanctioning of common wrongs is problematic because the magnitude of the 
sanction (in aggregate) attached to a given wrong is excessive compared to what both legal 
orders would consider to be just.  However, as will be shown all three types of problematic 
legal pluralism identified have the potential to produce injustices.  Importantly the mere 
existence of idiosyncratic wrongs is not considered to be problematic as it does not 
necessarily lead to the generation of negative production externalities or injustices.    Indeed 
the existence of idiosyncratic wrongs under various non-state legal orders (whether they be 
generated by religious, social, sporting, commercial or many other types of groupings) that 
are punished by sanctions that are non-state wrongs describes many well functioning 
harmonious societies.   
 
4.1 Rivalrous Compliance 
Rivalrous compliance arises when avoiding wrong behaviour under one legal order 
necessarily leads to wrong behaviour under the other legal order.  This situation necessarily 
forces the individual to choose between committing a wrong under one or the other legal 
order.  Rivalrous compliance results from two specific circumstances, opposite conceptions 
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of wrong and rivalrous imperatives.  The first circumstance, opposite conceptions of wrong 
refers to a situation when a given act is prohibited under one legal order but deemed to be an 
imperative under the other.  Examples include the imperative imposed on an initiated Sikh to 
carry a Kirpan under the Five Articles and a prohibition on carrying knives by the state; the 
imperative imposed on a Catholic priest to divulge the contents of a conversation under oath 
by the state and the prohibition under Canon Law on breaking the seal of Confession; the 
prohibition placed on a police officer in acting in a partial manner and the imperative 
imposed under the customary law of Papua New Guinea to always help your kin, no matter 
your office. The second circumstance is the existence of rivalrous imperatives, which refers 
to a situation when the commission of two different imperative acts under each legal order is 
required but they are mutually exclusive.  This situation is most likely to arise due to finite 
resources, most usually time or money.  However, an example that does not include time is 
the imperative to wear a motorcycle helmet by the state and the imperative under the Five 
Articles for male Sikhs to wear a turban and unshorn hair. 
Using the framework developed and set notation, rivalrous compliance, arises with:    
                              {                                  } 
                      {                            }    
The existence of rivalrous compliance is clearly problematic for the individuals subject to 
legal pluralism but it is also problematic for the legal orders themselves, as whatever the 
decision of an individual, a wrong has been committed under one or the other legal order.  As 
discussed later, the existence of rivalrous compliance also has the ability to have detrimental 
effects on a legal order’s cost and production functions.      
4.2 Sanctions that are Wrongs 
The second case of problematic legal pluralism occurs when the sanctions of one legal order 
are considered wrong by the other.  Using set notation: 
                         {                                  }        
Sanctions that are wrongs can arise both in relation to the punishment of idiosyncratic wrongs 
and common wrongs.  There are countless examples of this phenomenon, as by definition all 
sanctions are harms, and many harms are wrongs (unless sanctioned as punishment).  At its 
most extreme, a non-state legal order may sanction a homicide for a grave wrong, either 
common or idiosyncratic.
37
       
                                                          
37
 While it may be more intuitive to consider this problem arising in relation to non-state sanctions that are state 
wrongs (e.g. a payback killing under customary law in Papua New Guinea) it could also arise in relation to state 
sanctions that are non-state wrongs (e.g. a state execution deemed wrong by a non-state legal order).  Whether a 
state sanction is considered a wrong by a non-state legal order will largely rest on whether it accepts the 
legitimacy of the state and its sanctioning process (which is effectively the non-state version of ‘state legal 
pluralism’).  While casual observation suggests this is indeed normally the case, it is not always.  For instance, 
the legitimacy of the state itself may be disputed (e.g. apartheid South Africa); the legitimacy of legal order may 
be disputed (e.g. Nazi law); the legitimacy of the sanctioning process may be disputed (e.g. due to rampant 
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4.3 Uncoordinated Sanctioning of Common Wrongs  
The existence of common wrongs raises the potential for the third type of problematic legal 
pluralism, uncoordinated sanctioning of (common) wrongdoers.  While the existence of 
common wrongs is a necessary condition for excessive sanctions, it is not sufficient.  
Excessive sanctioning will occur when the legal orders fail to co-ordinate the enforcement of 
sanctions, in terms of total magnitude of sanction.  This type of problematic legal pluralism 
arises when both legal orders have the same conceptions of wrong but effectively ignore the 
other’s sanction.38 If both legal orders impose a high magnitude sanction without recognising 
the other, the total sanction the individual faces is in excess of what either legal order 
considers just.  In terms of set notation: 
                                          {                       
        }  
The prominence of uncoordinated sanctioning of common wrongs is more likely to arise 
when non-state sanctions are of high magnitude.  However, more generally it can be seen as a 
problem that arises when the two legal orders’ sanctions are substitutes in terms of magnitude 
but they are not recognised by the other, for example, ignored or perceived as complements.  
While this form of problematic legal pluralism is clearly troublesome for the wrongdoer it is 
not apparent that this form of problematic legal pluralism will directly affect either legal 
order’s production or cost functions.    
4.4 Consequences of Problematic Legal Pluralism 
In short problematic legal pluralism has the potential to negatively affect a legal order’s 
production and/or cost functions.  This can make enforcement activity less productive or 
more costly.  If this is acute, the existence of problematic legal pluralism can make one or 
both legal orders enforcement activity (and any deterrent effect they are hoping to generate) 
ineffective both in relation to idiosyncratic and common wrongs. 
In relation to idiosyncratic wrongs, non-state sanctions that are state wrongs will directly 
increase the cost of non-state enforcement, as there is a probability that those who execute a 
non-state sanction will be sanctioned themselves.  However, the existence of non-state 
sanctions that are wrongs will also detrimentally affect the state legal order.  This is so as the 
propensity to commit a state wrong has increased and therefore for a given level of 
enforcement effort the probability of being sanctioned by the state will fall, as its 
enforcement efforts are spread more thinly.  A similar effect should result in relation to 
situations of rivalrous compliance, as the propensity to increase idiosyncratic wrongs under 
both legal orders will increase with the other’s level of enforcement.  In relation to rivalrous 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
corruption); or a non-state legal order may consider that a given act is never sanctionable (e.g. the Brethren, 
Mennonites, Amish and Quakers all refuse to recognise the right of the state to commit homicide (Gudorf 2013).  
Despite these important exceptions, for reasons of practicality the discussion is focussed on non-state sanctions 
that are state wrongs.  
38
 This analysis shows that the potential inefficiencies from multiple enforcement as identified by Landes and 
Posner (1975) and Kaplow and Shavell (2007)  is a subset of a co-ordination problem associated with common 
wrongs, which is one of the three potential causes identified here. 
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compliance, there is also the special case where a factor of production faces such a scenario: 
for instance, a state agent (e.g. a police officer) compromised by another legal order.   
In relation common wrongs, the existence of sanctions that are wrongs and situations of 
rivalrous compliance faced by those imbedded in a legal order’s will have a similar result.  
This suggests that even if the two legal orders are concerned with sanctioning the same 
wrong behaviour (for example, murder, rape and robbery), the existence of sanctions that are 
wrongs and situations of rivalrous compliance can lead to a net fall in deterrence for common 
wrongs. This result is not simply an intellectual curiosity as Larcom (2013b) has shown that 
countries that had pre-colonial institutions that condoned high magnitude privately enforced 
sanctions (e.g. retributive killings) currently have lower levels of state crime enforcement and 
higher levels of crime, while controlling for a range of other relevant factors.
39
    
While the third type of problematic legal pluralism, the uncoordinated sanctioning of 
common wrongs should not directly enter either legal orders’ production or cost functions, it 
is still problematic because it can result in injustices for the wrongdoer.  This is so as he or 
she can be excessively sanctioned in relation to what each legal order would consider to be 
just.  As will be discussed in the next section, this arises when legal orders act simultaneously 
in sanctioning common wrongdoers, when sequential enforcement would produce a more just 
outcome. 
5. SOME ‘CURES’ FOR PROBLEMATIC LEGAL PLURALISM 
If they are significant, the most obvious response to these problematic interactions is for a 
society to become legally monistic.  Perhaps the state could engage in a ‘surge’ in 
enforcement, above what would be statically optimal, with the aim of eliminating the non-
state legal order (or the parts that are problematic).  However, non-state legal orders can be 
stubbornly persistent, despite concerted efforts to eradicate them.
40
  In any case, non-state 
legal orders may also generate substantial benefits, despite the problematic interactions.  
Another potential solution is for the state to withdraw completely or to withdraw enforcement 
based on type of person or geography.  The history of Western Europe is replete with 
examples of the state withdrawing enforcement based on type of person and/or geography,  
which currently occurs to some extent in relation to Native American Law in the United 
States and Canada.
41
  While complete or partial state withdrawal always remains a 
possibility, the discussion below focuses on how each specific form of problematic legal 
pluralism can be ameliorated based on the assumption that the state remains in situ enjoys at 
least a degree of legitimacy   In considering these potential ‘cures’ it is worth pondering 
                                                          
39
 Also see Larcom and Swanson (2013) for a detailed study of this particular phenomenon relating to retributive 
violence and group loyalty in Papua New Guinea.  
40
This may be due to internalised views of law (Hart 1961) or the fact that in many developing (and some 
developed) countries the state is (and sometimes always has been) relatively weak in relation to non-state legal 
orders.  In some (failed) states, non-state legal orders may even have more resources and higher levels of 
productivity. 
41
 In relation to the state withdrawing enforcement activity in Europe, two prominent examples are the benefit of 
clergy rule under English law that existed for many centuries (see Briggs et al. 1996) and the legal arrangements 
depending on one’s religion in (and soon after) the period of Moorish domination of Spain (see Benton 2002). 
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Damaska’s (1986) theory of criminal procedure which highlights the perceived role of the 
state in society.  That is, whether one perceives the state as a policy implementing social 
engineer or conflict solver.  It should also be noted that the willingness of either legal order to 
adopt any of these approaches will depend on the perceived gravity of the wrongs in question 
and the political and legal constraints that each face.   
5.1 Sanctions that are wrongs 
There are two broad approaches that can be taken by the state to ameliorate the problem of 
non-state sanctions that are deemed wrong.  If the wrong is idiosyncratic to the non-state 
legal order, the state can sanction it itself.  This was a common practice among European 
colonial administrations (Morse and Woodman 1998).
42
  However, this is not costless, 
especially if state law is seen as a tool for social engineering. As would be expected, 
Geschiere (2006) finds evidence that state adoption of non-state wrongs can entrench 
internalised beliefs in the wrongfulness of such behaviour.
43
  If the wrong is common to both 
legal orders, the state can aim to sanction the wrongdoer (or signal its willingness to do so) 
before he/she is sanctioned by the non-state legal order.  One example of this, in addition to 
mitigating flight risk, is imprisoning suspects prior to trial.  As long as the state sanction is 
perceived to be a sufficient and legitimate substitute, this approach will reduce the propensity 
of the non-state legal order to enforce a sanction that is deemed to be a state wrong. 
The second approach is for the state to exempt, or provide a defence, for such sanctions that 
would normally be considered wrong.  A well known example is baseball’s effective 
exemption from anti-trust law in the United States.  Without this, some sanctions imposed on 
players and clubs by the Baseball Commissioner would almost certainly be state wrongs 
(Sommer 2012). 
A non-state legal order can also take ameliorative action; specifically it can alter its 
conception of wrong or change the type of its sanction that it attaches to it.  The Catholic 
Church’s stance on usury provides an example of a non-state legal order redefining what it 
deems to be wrong behaviour.  While the Catholic Church continues to deem usury to be an 
explicit wrong, how it is defined has changed since the 12
th
 Century (Reed and Bekar 2003).  
In terms of substituting sanctions it is also noteworthy that while medieval Church Courts did 
not impose death sentences (leaving that solely to the state) they did imprison wrongdoers for 
ecclesiastical wrongs (Langbein 1976).  Another example relates to the practice of indigenous 
customary law, where the use of elaborate peace ceremonies and compensation agreements 
has replaced retributive violence in some communities (Larcom 2013a).                    
5.2 Rivalrous Compliance 
                                                          
42
For example, given the gravity of sorcery and adultery under customary law in Papua New Guinea, where 
homicide was often a legitimate sanction for such behaviour, the colonial administration made both behaviours 
crimes with considerable prison terms attached (Jinks et al 1973).    
43
 In analysing the consequences of the state adopting witchcraft as a crime in Cameroon and South Africa he 
evidence that it has entrenched belief in its existence and its power within these societies. 
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Ameliorating the effects of rivalrous compliance requires one legal order to ‘reform itself’ or 
provide an exception for those individuals placed in such a circumstance.  If neither legal 
order is willing (or able) to do this, this form of problematic legal pluralism could persist 
indefinitely.  In relation to priest-penitent privilege, while Catholic priests have no explicit 
priestly privilege in England, they do in all 50 U.S. states and the District of Colombia and in 
numerous civil law jurisdictions in other parts of the world (Cassidy 2002).   Despite no 
explicit exemption in the United Kingdom convictions over the last two centuries have been 
almost non-existent.
44
  This highlights another form of amelioration; prosecutorial discretion 
and tacit non-enforcement.  The unwillingness of state agents (whether they be police, 
prosecutors, judges or juries) to enforce sanctions that are deemed to be unfair, immoral or 
excessive has been well documented.
45
   
Another religious example relates to the Five Articles of Faith of Sikhs.  In many states, 
persons are prohibited from carrying knives in public places while the persons riding a 
motorcycle must wear a helmet.  The first case relates opposite conceptions of wrong while 
the second relates to the performance of mutually exclusive imperatives (as the wearing of 
unshorn hair and a turban can preclude the wearing of a motorcycle helmet).  In response, 
some nations have explicitly exempted Sikhs from the prohibition of carrying knives and/or 
the imperative of wearing a motorcycle helmet.  For instance, the Criminal Justice Act 1988 
in the United Kingdom provides a specific exemption for carrying an offensive weapon for 
religious purposes, while the Motor Cycles (Protective Helmets) Regulations 1980 contains a 
specific exemption for Sikhs wearing turbans.  In relation to wearing a helmet, observant 
Sikhs would be required to substitute away from motorbike to other forms of travel.  
Avoiding circumstances of rivalrous compliance is often used by state and non-state legal 
orders with various ‘conflict of interest’ measures.  For instance, it was a common colonial 
practice to deliberately station police and state agents away from their home communities, 
despite their local knowledge.   
5.3 Uncoordinated Sanctioning of Common Wrongs    
The phenomenon of uncoordinated sanctioning of common wrongs occurs where both the 
state and non-state legal order impose high magnitude sanctions on the same wrong.  It is 
therefore likely that it will be most evident in societies subject to a colonial legal transplant 
(e.g. indigenous communities in settler nations and post-colonial states).  However, instances 
of vigilantism, vendetta, and organised crime executions occur in Western societies.
46
  As in 
relation to non-state sanctions that are wrongs, this can be ameliorated by effectively moving 
from a simultaneous enforcement game to a sequential enforcement game.  Specifically, if 
the state is able quickly signal that it will sanction a wrongdoer it should reduce the 
propensity of a high magnitude non-state sanction being enforced. 
                                                          
44
 This uncertainty seems to arise from the paucity of cases before the courts on this matter over the last two 
centuries (see See Ormerod and Hooper 2014 ).  
45
 See Kahan (2000) for a discussion and formal model that takes account of this phenomenon.   
46
 For instance, Vendetta was practiced in parts of Southern Europe well into the 20th Century and still continues 
some pockets (Spierenburg 2012). 
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Alternatively, and more controversially, the state could recognise a high magnitude non-state 
sanction as a valid substitute for its own high magnitude sanction.  While this was once 
common practice in England and some other European societies (see Friedman 1979, 1984 
and Garoupa and Klerman 2010), the most notable current examples of this practice occur in 
post colonial states.  For instance, in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iran and parts of Nigeria, the 
state recognises the payment of a diyya (a specified or mutually agreed compensation 
payment under Islamic law) to wholly substitute for a death sentence or imprisonment (Badar 
2011).
47
  Some other post-colonial states, where indigenous custom is still widely practiced, 
large compensation payments can substitute for imprisonment, sometimes formally and more 




This article is based on the assumption that multiple legal orders, with their own separate 
sources of legitimacy, can co-exist in a society for considerable periods of time, perhaps 
indefinitely.  Legal pluralism can arise due to migration, colonisation, conquest or the 
formation of autochthonous groups within a society who generate their own rules – all of 
which seems to be continually repeated throughout human history.  Therefore, given that the 
phenomenon of legal pluralism seems to be ubiquitous both across place and time, this article 
has focused on identifying the precise causes of problematic legal pluralism and how each 
can be ameliorated.  In doing so, it is hoped that this analysis will guide future empirical and 
theoretical research and inform policy discussions on the phenomenon.   Conceptual 
advances and classification schemes have often proven to be important in the history of 
scholarship: whether this analysis proves useful or not remains to be seen, as one must wait 
and see how the framework is used to solve problems and facilitate discussions.  In 
conclusion, it is worth highlighting again what is not problematic about legal pluralism.  It 
was shown that problematic legal pluralism may arise when the legal orders have the same 
conceptions of wrongdoing and may not arise when they have different conceptions of 
wrongdoing.  A key insight gained from this analysis is to recognise the distinction between 
legally wrong behaviour and the sanctions that are attached to such behaviour.  In the absence 
of rivalrous compliance, legal orders can co-exist harmoniously with a very different set of 
idiosyncratic wrongs as long as the sanctions attached to wrong behaviour are not deemed to 
be wrong by the other.  For instance, some religious legal orders may deem apostasy, usury, 
abortion, working on holydays and consumption of proscribed products as wrong.  However, 
as long as the sanctions for such wrongs are not state wrongs, problematic legal pluralism 
will not arise – unless of course the state (or non-state legal order) takes an activist (or 
antagonistic) stance toward the other.  Indeed the harmonious co-existence of the state with 
non-state regulators captures many current interactions, relating not only to religion, but also 
companies, sporting associations and professional bodies.  In relation to common wrongs, 
                                                          
47
 Indeed, Hasan (2011) notes that it was the Pakistani state’s explicit recognition of Shair’a Law in their 
Criminal Code, that allowed U.S. ‘diplomat’ Ramond Davis to be freed from prison and to leave Pakistan.  This 
is despite him being charged with two counts of murder and the Pakistani state unwilling to recognise his claim 
for diplomatic immunity. 
48
 See Larcom (2013) for an account of this in Bougainville Island where the state has effectively re-ordered the 
sanctioning process, allowing customary law to enforce (non-violent) sanctions first, even for gravest of crimes. 
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again the degree of harmony achieved will depend on the type of sanctions used, and the 
degree of co-ordination between legal orders. 
Every society must grapple with legal pluralism and this paper identifies when it is 
problematic and when it is not in relation to wrongdoing – both in terms of those individuals 
who are subject to multiple legal orders enforcing their rules on them and the legal orders 
themselves.  If one wishes to ameliorate these problematic interactions there are three policy 
prescriptions that fall from this analysis.  The first relates most closely to those societies who 
received colonial legal transplants and where pre-colonial legal institutions remain strong; it 
may be better for the state to recognise non-state sanctions as substitutes to their own – if 
they are in fact substitutes.  The second relates most closely to those states that are 
experiencing large scale migration from cultures and religions different from the majority of 
their citizens; in relation to instances of rivalrous compliance it may be better for states to use 
the discretion available to them and provide those who face these situations with exemptions, 
if it means a great deal to them and little to the state.  The third relates to the non-state legal 
orders themselves; if they wish to avoid trouble with a (liberal) state they should not enforce 
sanctions that are state wrongs.  
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